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Abstract
China and Vietnam have experienced waves of labour and welfare reform since both 
countries shifted to market socialism, pursuing a development model that depends 
on the labour of millions of rural–urban migrants in global factories. Their simi-
lar development trajectories are productive for theorizing the relationship between 
labour and welfare. This article conceptualises the two countries’ distinctive regime 
of migrant labour welfare as integral to a cycle of commodification that encom-
passes the overlapping processes of commodification, de-commodification and re-
commodification of labour. After decades of collectivized labour under state social-
ism, the cycle begins with the commodification of labour through market reforms 
that led to mass rural–urban migration and the rise of the global factory alongside 
the dismantling of the former socialist welfare system. It was then followed by de-
commodification attempts aimed at providing forms of social protection that offset 
the labour precarity caused by decades of labour market liberalisation. Despite the 
emergence of new universal welfare programs, the market has increasingly intruded 
into social protection, especially through financialized products targeted at the 
labouring masses who must compensate for the failings of public welfare programs. 
As such, these welfare regimes are undergoing a process of re-commodification in 
which the protection of labour is re-embedded into the market as a commodity to be 
consumed by the migrant workers with their meagre wages. The “cycle of commodi-
fication” offers an analytical framework to understand welfare regimes as a social 
and political field that keeps evolving in response to the changing global valuation 
of labour.
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Introduction
The welfare state originally emerged out of an attempt to alleviate the social con-
sequences of labour commodification through basic social protection, before devel-
oping into institutions of the good life and social citizenship in Europe (Esping-
Anderson, 1990; Kaufmann et al., 2012; Rothstein, 1998). These underlying goals 
of European welfare states have been under assault by neoliberal restructuring in the 
last decades. Welfare in East Asian contexts, known to be shaped by the Confucian 
emphasis on self-reliance and familialism (Sheng & Settles, 2006; Truong, 2007; 
Zhan & Montgomery, 2003), has also been undergoing major changes induced by 
processes of restructuring, albeit with distinct dynamics and directions (Walker 
& Wong, 2005). In particular, China and Vietnam’s successive waves of welfare 
transformations are shaped by their concurrent adoption of a market economy and 
continued pursuit of socialist goals since the turn of the 1980s. Market reforms in 
both countries around the early 1980s disrupted the former socialist welfare system, 
weakening the protection for the very people whose livelihoods were at risk because 
of marketization. For example, public services were de-coupled from central fis-
cal budget, resulting in the near collapse of public health care and public school 
enrolment dropping by millions (Bryant, 1998; Gao, 1999). China and Vietnam’s 
rise to be the global factories since 2000s has been predicated on the large pool 
of low-waged rural-to-urban migrant labour as global corporations’ enormous profit 
dependent on countries at the lower end of supply chains (Chan et al., 2013; Lin, 
2020: 46). Both countries have recently re-introduced contributory and toward-
universal legal coverage welfare programs (new universal welfare reform),1 partly 
in response to the economic crisis and social unrest caused by market reforms and 
globalization. Pension insurance sets to be extended to all rural Chinese by 2020 
(Duckett, 2011; Shen & Williamson, 2010), and voluntary pension scheme is rolled 
out in Vietnam targeting the self-employed and rural residents (Giang, 2004). New 
public health insurance schemes are set to reach most of the population (Ta et al., 
2020).
In China and Vietnam, the changeover from state socialist regimes to market-
Leninist political economies, “market socialism” in the party state’s language, has 
shaped the new social policies governing labour welfare and social stratification 
(London, 2014). While the Chinese government has increased welfare expenditure 
and expanded provision coverage, the welfare regime is considered more productive 
than protective (Rudra, 2007; Tillin & Duckett, 2017), as local governments prior-
itize economic growth and political stability (Leung & Xu, 2015; Mok et al., 2017), 
1 Despite being underfunded, contributory and not-yet-universal-coverage in nature with high inequality, 
many characterize the welfare social policy in the two countries and the global south as universal welfare 
reform, see for example, Flatø and Zhang (2016), Nguyen and Chen (2017), and Böger and Leisering 
(2020). We use the term ‘new universal welfare’ thereafter in this particular context, which is different 
from the ‘universal welfare’ in the developed world. We have also provided much-needed critique of 
this ‘new universal welfare’ throughout the paper, particularly in the sections of ‘The new universalism’, 
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diverging from global norms or even national policy goals. Social welfare in China, 
for some, has enlarged the income gap (Gao & Ruskin, 2013) while basic social pro-
grams, such as the Minimum Livelihood Guarantee (MLG) programs, mostly serve 
to prevent social instability (Solinger, 2017). Vietnam’s trajectory resembles Chi-
na’s in some policy areas, especially the increasing marketization of public health 
services (London, 2014; Malesky & London, 2014). With growing industrialisa-
tion that demands mass labour, meanwhile, how the welfare of the huge number 
of rural–urban migrants, combined more than 200 million, is attended to becomes 
one of the most pertinent social questions in both countries. This question is fore-
grounded by the divisive household registration institution (hukou in Chinese/ho 
khau in Vietnamese) that defines welfare entitlement according to one’s formal 
place of residence, largely denying rural migrants’ access to urban welfare (Dong & 
Goodburn, 2019; Hardy, 2001; Wang, 2005). Distinctively in both countries, rural 
welfare continues to be instrumental for migrant households since small children 
and the elderly tend to remain in the countryside, partly due to the exclusion of 
migrants from urban welfare, partly due to translocal household strategies adopted 
by many who seek to combine migrant work with family life (Jacka, 2018; Oakes & 
Schein, 2005). This particular institutional context not only raises questions about 
the equality of rights at work and entitlements of social protection advocated by the 
Decent Work Agenda (ILO, 1999), but also draws attention to the care of labour as 
integral to the social person in contexts where people cannot simultaneously live 
with their family and provide for it.
In this paper, we consider how these questions have been addressed in the differ-
ent waves of welfare transformations in global China and Vietnam since the market 
reforms. Reviewing the literature on institutional changes in migrant workers’ wel-
fare (Friedman & Lee, 2010; Lin, 2019a; Pun, 2016; Siu & Unger, 2019) and the 
theorization of care under market socialism (Jacka, 2018; London, 2014; Nguyen 
& Chen, 2017), and based on the findings from our research projects in China and 
Vietnam, we put forward the notion of “cycle of commodification” as an analytical 
tool to unpack the underlying mechanisms of welfare transformations and the impli-
cations for rural-to-urban migrant workers in the last decades.
According to Polanyi (2001), excessive marketization has the tendency to “disem-
bed” the economy from social relations, turning labour, alongside money and land, 
into “fictitious commodities”. Labour thereby is made into an object of exchange as 
if it were external to human beings. The commodification of labour, often accompa-
nied by labour migration, leads to market-induced misery and vulnerability of the 
workers, which threaten to destabilise society. This tends to prompt societal actions 
to re-embed the economy through measures to de-commodify labour, notably the 
provision of state welfare and regulatory labour laws (Esping-Anderson, 1990). 
These dynamics have been observed in post-reform China and Vietnam, where the 
commodification of rural labour, coinciding with massive lay-off of socialist labour 
and the dismantling of socialist welfare, generated much social discontent. This dis-
content becomes one of the driving forces for higher societal attention to social pro-
tection as a countermovement to the labour precarity caused by marketization. The 
instalment of aforementioned new types of universal welfare schemes has been as 
much an outcome of this countermovement (Nguyen & Chen, 2017) as an indication 
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of reflexive engagement with the notion of welfare as an institution of the good life 
(Kaufman et al., 2012). The seeming turn to de-commodification (Esping-Anderson, 
1990), we argue, is, however, intercepted by another intertwined process of re-com-
modification,2 in which the social protection of labour is re-embedded into the mar-
ket, through financial products and services to be consumed by the labour force. 
The state-endorsed emphasis on self-responsibility and mobilization of non-state 
actors in welfare provision, notably through the rhetoric of “socialization” (Nguyen, 
2018), plays a key role in this shift towards re-commodification of migrant labour. 
The cycle of commodification, however, does not signify a complete return to either 
commodification or de-commodification at any stage. In the following discussion, 
we suggest a pattern of two contradictory social forces coming into struggle with 
each other, generating dynamics that become more pronounced at a particular period 
because of specific political economic trajectories.
The commodification of labour
In China and Vietnam, the commodification of labour is essential to the market 
reforms that triggered dispossession and rural–urban migration simultaneously. In 
China, the rural communes were replaced by the household contract system, making 
redundant a large part of the rural labour force, which, with the entry of millions of 
young people every year, has been finding employment and livelihood opportuni-
ties in factories located in distant coastal cities. Meanwhile, rural urbanization led 
to mass land expropriation, driving 50–66 million peasants away from their rural 
homelands between 1990 and 2002 (Hsing, 2010: 32). The number of rural work-
ers had increased to about 290 million, 174 million of them are migrant workers by 
2018 (National Bureau of Statistics, 2020). In urban China, privatization of less stra-
tegic state-owned enterprises (SOE) renders 36 million urban workers unemployed 
between 1990 and 1999 (Huang, 2005: 346) alongside the dismantling of the work-
unit (danwei) based welfare system.
Similar patterns of restructuring took place in Vietnam. Since the doi moi reform 
of 1986, the restructuring of SOEs was accompanied by de-collectivisation in agri-
culture, as hundreds of thousands of households were dispossessed from their farm-
lands (Phuc, 2014). Decreased agricultural employment and the appeal of work 
opportunities in new industrial centres also meant that millions of rural people left 
their villages to work in factories; there were at least five million migrant workers 
by 2019 (Oxfam, 2020). Like their Chinese counterparts, Vietnamese workers’ life 
is characterised by precarious employment and inferior conditions of urban citi-
zenship induced by the household registration system (Nguyen et  al., 2015). This 
2 Re-commodification is a term coined by Holden (2003) in a different context with different meaning, 
referring to the shift from Keynesian welfare state to Schumpeterian workfare regime, largely focus-
ing on Active Labour Market Policies, in the EU. We borrow the term to analyse labour welfare policy 
reform in China and Vietnam.
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dispossession-migration nexus in both countries displays dynamics reminiscent of 
the enclosure movement in the sixteen-century England (Wood, 2002: 108).
In contrast to those of agrarian capitalism in England, however, migrant workers 
in China and Vietnam are not just a geographical category of population but also a 
citizenship category. In tying upwelfare access and social rights to where people are 
registered, the Chinese household registration system prevents migrant workers from 
accessing citizenship-based rights and entitlements where they actually live and 
work (Zhang, 2018), resulting in institutional segregation between rural migrants 
and urban residents. In the same vein, albeit in a modified form, the Vietnamese ho 
khau system (Hardy, 2001) until recently had been divided but into four categories: 
KT1 permanent urban residents, KT2 permanent urban with different urban origin, 
KT3 long-term migrant, and KT4 short-term migrant (within 6 months). Despite 
sustained critiques of its injustice, the insistence on retaining the household regis-
tration system indicates continued interest in the control of migrant labour’s eco-
nomic and social reproduction. To a greater degree in China, this mobility control 
has worked particularly well along with the dormitory accommodation system to 
uphold the global factory development model for decades (Chan et al., 2013; Pun 
et  al., 2016; Sharif & Huang, 2019). As such, the household registration system 
facilitates the commodification of migrant labour—similar citizenship dynamics 
is observed amongst international migrant workers, such as in Southeast Asia and 
the Gulf countries under the “temporary contract migration scheme” (Rosewarne, 
2010).
Labour exploitation in the global factories that produce mass consumer goods 
for the world is well documented, especially following the two countries’ entry into 
WTO in the 2000s. The cheap labour that global factories need is secured through 
low wages and minimal care provision, coupled with unsafe and unhealthy shop 
floor environment, long work hours, and abusive management (Lee, 2007; Pun, 
2005; Thanh et  al., 2018). In 2006, over half of Chinese migrant workers earned 
below 800 yuan (USD120). Although their average wage in 2018 had reached 
around 3500 yuan (USD520), this accounted for only half of the urban workers’ 
average income (NBS, 2020). In Vietnam, wage employment increased from 19% 
in 1998 to 33% in 2006, while the share of agricultural jobs reduced from 67 to 49% 
(Cling et al., 2010). By the 2010s, the average income of a worker’s household was 
3.5–4.5 million VND (USD140-190), in a context where one household with four 
members required around 9–12 million VND (USD390-520) to maintain decent liv-
ing standards (Chae, 2018). Low wage could only be sustained over a long period 
thanks to a remuneration structure that incentivises working overtime and the neces-
sity for the workers to have their reproductive needs met in the countryside by the 
unpaid labour of family members. It also necessitates the introduction of welfare 
programs alongside advocating labour rights at work.
In response to resentment at the household registration system, both countries 
have introduced varying degrees of reform. In 2014, China’s State Council issued 
the Advice on Further Hukou System Innovation to allow more migrants to become 
urban residents, by introducing policies such as the blue-chop (temporary) resi-
dency and permanent residency score system, which were first piloted in Shanghai 
and Shenzhen. Through such modifications, the Chinese hukou system has enabled 
326 J. Lin, M. T. N. Nguyen 
1 3
even more sophisticated and subtle state control and surveillance of labour mobility 
(Chen & Fan, 2016; Dong & Goodburn, 2019). Vietnam’s KT3 or KT4 household 
statuses have given migrants more citizen rights and the enforcement of the regula-
tions was more lax (Chan & Wang, 2005). Since 2008, some of the key restrictions, 
such as schooling, health care, and bank loans, have been formally or informally 
lifted by the local authorities for migrant workers with a KT4 household status in 
several cities (Siu & Unger, 2019). However, permanent residents remain the most 
privileged, and rural migrants continue to be subjected to regular checks and con-
trols regarding their residence status.
The discipline instituted through the household registration system and the differ-
entiated social protection it enables has facilitated the extraction of migrant labour’s 
value for national development and global accumulation alike (Chan et  al., 2013; 
Lin, 2020: 46). Global corporations’ enormous profit and dominance in the indus-
trial hierarchy are made possible by global networks of suppliers that are perfectly 
situated for such extraction, not just in China (Chan et  al., 2013). Take Apple’s 
iPhone 4’s cost breakdown in 2011 as an example. The Chinese labour cost in the 
final manufacturing part takes only about 1.8% of the selling price, while supplier 
Foxconn pockets 14.3% and Apple itself 58.5% (Kraemer et  al., 2011: 5). Mean-
while, global capital movement chasing cheap labour and new market can lead to the 
rise and fall of industrial centres, such as Shenzhen since 1980s and Bac Ninh since 
1990s, alongside the growth and decline of the working class population (Lin, 2017; 
Silver, 2003). As wages are rising in China, corporations seek to relocate investment 
to other Southeast Asian countries where cheaper labour can still be found, Vietnam 
being one key destination, or they replace jobs with automation (Lin, 2020: 220). 
The current flurry of relocation by global corporations3 highlights the social and 
environmental consequences of the commodification of labour, while raising urgent 
questions about the protection of migrant labour in both abandoned places and new 
destinations.
De‑commodification
Given the growing social inequalities and uneven development induced by mar-
ketization and commodification of labour, the urgency of de-commodification has 
become a societal concern that cannot be ignored. We suggest that the expansion 
of state welfare programs such as universal health insurance or voluntary basic 
pension is an effect of this social imperative. At the most basic level, de-commod-
ification represents a process4 in which a person can maintain a livelihood with-
out immediately submitting their subsistence needs to the whims of the market 
3 For detail, see the recent report ‘Moving factories from China to Southeast Asia? Watch out for rising 
costs and strikes’ https:// www. scmp. com/ accessed on 10.01.2021.
4 Beside labour de-commodification in the realm of state welfare, the institutionalization of freedom of 
association and the right to organize is labour de-commodification in the realm of industrial relations. 
See Friedman and Lee (2010), Friedman (2013).
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(Esping-Anderson, 1990: 163–5). As such, the extent to which these new welfare 
programs in China and Vietnam contribute to de-commodification is questionable, 
given their outcomes for the migrant labour force.
The new universalism
With contributory health and social insurance now universally available in both 
countries, a new form of universalism has emerged. In China, reform initiated in 
2009 sees basic healthcare insurance coverage increased from 25% in 1999 to over 
90% in 2016, with around 60% share of out-of-pocket expenditure (Ta et al., 2020). 
A mixed pension system first offered to urban SOE workers in 1995 has also been 
extended to all types of urban workers in 1997 and the urban self-employed in 2005. 
Government and Institution Pension, fully subsidised until 2015, remains the most 
privileging. While Enterprise Employee Basic Pension increased from 711 yuan per 
month in 2004 to 2353 yuan in 2015 on average, the Urban–Rural Resident Social 
Pension only made one adjustment from 55 to 70 yuan per month over the same 
period (Zhu and Walker, 2018). The disparities of pension payments between the 
developed cities and western and rural China are also large, with benefits in Beijing 
more than seven times the national level. This new universalism, nonetheless, dif-
fers starkly with the universalism of socialist welfare, with which citizen rights to 
the care of the state via agricultural collectives or industrial work units are part of 
the social contract. While to some extent reinstating the socialist ideal through a 
thin layer of protection, these new programs in fact highlight the importance of self-
responsibility by individuals and families (Nguyen, 2020a) and solidify the existing 
inequalities in social protection, which will be discussed further in the next section.
There is in the meantime increasing social awareness of the significance of 
migrant labour, resulting in stronger moral imperative and political urgency for the 
care of the migrant workers. Yet, while rural migrants have been gradually included 
into social insurance programs, meaningful social protection outcomes remain elu-
sive. The Chinese MLG programs (dibao), introduced in late 1990s as an urban 
social assistance program first aimed at compensating for the breakdown of SOE 
welfare and pacifying protesting laid off workers, was extended to rural areas in 2007 
(Gao, 2017). New Rural Cooperative Medical System (NRCMS) was introduced 
in 2002 and achieved broad coverage by 2013 (Müller, 2016). Contributory social 
insurance programs also emerged in the same period, but migrant workers, particu-
larly those without labour contracts, were largely excluded until recently (Gao et al., 
2012). Not until 2006 did the Chinese government aim for increasing the coverage 
of migrant workers’ social protection by 2020 (State Council, 2006). For the first 
time, they were seen as a target group of social policy making. The Social Insurance 
Law 2011 officially requires the enrolment of migrant workers into the core social 
insurance programmes, the so-called “five insurances”, including pension, medical, 
unemployment, work-related injury, and maternity insurances, and housing fund 
with great contributing variation across regions and sectors (Table 1). In the state-
led contributory pension insurance program, civil servants pay minimal contribution 
with comprehensive coverage, while migrant workers give up a substantial portion 
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of their wages on medical care (Carrillo et al., 2017: 418). Despite medical insur-
ance, the high proportion of out-of-pocket payments for treatment costs has major 
impoverishment effect for the migrant workers, especially in the case of serious/ter-
minal disease (Liu et al., 2003; Wagstaff et al., 2018).
Similarly, the Vietnamese welfare system privileges state employees and those 
with military or other merits to the nation, while a thin layer of protection is 
extended to the rest, migrant workers included. Vietnam’s overall social protection 
has significantly increased in breadth (how many is covered), from 4.9% in 2005 to 
90.1% in 2015, but only gained moderate depth (how much benefits are received) 
from 2% to 4.6% in the same period (Asian Development Bank, 2020). Vietnam’s 
social security and welfare for the working population is dominated by contributory 
pay‐as‐you‐go (unfunded) insurance system (Evans & Harkness, 2008). The Law 
on Social Insurance introduced in 2006, amended in 2014, stipulates that workers 
are required to contribute into mandatory social insurance in retirement, sickness 
and maternity, occupational disease and accident, and survivorship (Long, 2013). 
In the case of pension, the respective contributions of employers and employees 
are capped at 14% and 8% (Table 1). The coverage of the Viet Nam Health Insur-
ance, established in 1995, has expanded from only 16% in 2002 with both com-
pulsory and voluntary schemes to more than 80% of the Vietnamese population by 
2018 (Evans et al., 2008; Nguyen, 2020a, b). Given the fast increase in coverage, 
both countries have moved themselves from the bottom in terms of equity in health 
care—the World Health Report 2000 ranked Vietnam at 187th place and China at 
188th out of 190 countries (Ramesh, 2013)—to an improved overall performance in 
late 2010s (WHO, 2018). Yet, health care services in both countries are becoming 
more and more expensive, with about one tenth of Vietnamese households directing 
10% or above of their expenditures to health. The figure almost doubled in China 
at 17.7%, which is much higher than in Laos at 3%, Australia at 3.7%, and Japan at 
6.2% (WHO, 2018). As such, universal health insurance barely protects against the 
rising health care costs in both countries, where health services are more and more 
privatised, although it has become imperative for people to acquire it to offset the 
otherwise astronomical costs (Nguyen, 2018). For the migrant workers, the situation 
is even more trenchant.
Table 1  Official social insurance contribution share from the wages in China and Vietnam. Source: 
developed by authors, with data from Social Security Programs throughout the World: Asia and the 
Pacific, 2018 (ISSA 2019) (In contrast to China, Vietnamese workers have to pay 2% towards trade union 
contributions)
Social insurance China Vietnam
Worker (%) Employer (%) Worker (%) Employer (%)
Pension 8 14 8 14
Medical (Maternity inc.) 2 6.35 1.5 6
Unemployment 0.2 0.32–0.8 1 1
Work-related injury – 0.1–0.7 – 0.5
Total 10.2 20.77–21.85 10.5 21.5
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Migrant workers and the limits of the new universalism
The implementation of social insurance programs for migrant workers is character-
ised by low compliance by employers and low participation by employees. Employ-
ers’ default on social insurance contributions has been prevalent (Nyland et  al., 
2011), which often sparked labour protests, such as the 2014 Yue Yuan strikes in 
Dongguan (Schmalz et al., 2017). Chinese migrant worker participation rate in social 
insurance programs in 2014 stood at 26.2% for injury, 17.6% for medical, 16.7% for 
pension, 10.5% for unemployment, 7.8% for maternity, and 5.5% for housing fund 
(National Bureau of Statistics, 2015). The Chinese government stopped publishing 
statistics collected after 2014. In Vietnam, while over 80% of working population 
has health insurance by 2018, most of the migrants who do not have it, however, 
considered it unnecessary (50%) or too costly (25%). When sick, the majority of 
migrants attend state hospital/clinics, about 63% paying for their treatment them-
selves and only 50% using health insurance to cover their costs (UNESCO, 2020).
Several structural issues account for migrant workers’ low participation rate. 
First, funds accumulated in individual accounts in China are often not transferrable 
between regional jurisdictions due to decentralized and fragmented fiscal systems 
with funds for social insurance pooled locally (Carrillo, 2016). The imbalance of 
development results in lack of incentives for cooperation between regional govern-
ments in China. Even after the central state promised reforms that connect the local 
systems in 2011, the bureaucratic obstacles to claiming insurance benefits across 
regions remain enormous, requiring a long list of documents from numerous gov-
ernment units. The second deterrent to migrant workers’ motivation to participate 
is the high degree of job mobility. Some social insurance funds only allow pen-
sion withdrawal after at least 15-years of contributions, including five consecutive 
years of contribution in the final years of employment for some local jurisdictions 
(Carrillo, 2016). It is difficult for migrant workers to foresee that they will make 
contributions for such a long time because of their mobility. As they tend to prac-
tice translocal householding (Nguyen & Locke, 2014), it is all the more difficult to 
negotiate bureaucratic hurdles to the transferability of entitlements, comparable to 
the portable rights for international migrants (Piper, 2015), between urban work-
places and their villages. Since 2014, some provinces have allowed migrant workers 
to withdraw their social insurance funds from the local account when they move to a 
new location, albeit only their own-account contributions. On another level, migrant 
workers’ lack of motivation to participate in social insurance schemes boils down 
to the distrust between citizens and the state’s social services (Lin, 2019b; Tucker 
et al., 2016).
The contributory social insurance system in Vietnam also presents major chal-
lenges for the migrant workers. There is a mismatch between the long-term goal 
designed by the schemes, particularly pension, and the short-term nature of their 
employment. Employees are entitled to a pension only if they have contributed to 
the pension scheme for at least 20  years. Otherwise, they can only receive their 
pension benefits as a lump sum. Migrant workers often consider their social insur-
ance fund as a form of private saving and opt to gain early access as a lump sum 
(Nguyen, 2020b), foregoing the long-term benefits of the scheme. For the same level 
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of benefits, migrant workers in voluntary schemes must contribute almost 100% 
by themselves, whereas urban workers with formal contract co-contribute with the 
employers. As of 2015, only about 255,000 workers, or 0.8% of the total labour 
force, participated in the voluntary social insurance schemes (Castel & Pick, 2018). 
The low participation can also be partly attributed to migrant workers’ having not 
much faith in contributory government-run schemes (Nguyen, 2020b), similar to 
China.
As such, the welfare system functions as a system of stratification interacting 
with the citizenship and labour regimes to turn into an active force in the ordering of 
social relations. In particular, it contributes to maintaining the rural–urban divide as 
a central axis of social inequality in both countries. Further, the new form of welfare 
universalism makes it possible to the market to make inroads into social protection.
Re‑commodification
The expansion of state programs has gone hand in hand with the mobilization of a 
wide range of actors and the deployment of market logic for the provision of welfare, 
notably through the policy language of “socialisation”. Not only does the expansion 
of state welfare programs contribute to maintaining the unequal provision of care 
between migrant workers and urban citizens, it acts to facilitate re-commodification 
through enabling the intrusion of the market and finance. Rather than a “de-com-
modifying” arbiter, the state indeed acts increasingly as a “commodifying agent” or 
even a market player (Holden, 2003; Papadopoulos, 2005). This institutional context 
enables the re-commodification of labour in welfare reform.
The “socialization” of welfare
The term “socialization” in Vietnamese (xa hoi hoa) and Chinese discourse (she hui 
hua) has taken on a counterintuitive connotation in the post-reform period. Refer-
ring to the collectivization of the means of production during state socialism, it has 
come to signify the mobilization of responsibilities by “all the people” in official 
narratives (Nguyen, 2018). It is widely used in both countries out of a broad unease 
with the notion of “privatization” (si you hua; tư nhân hóa) that would sit uncom-
fortably with both the official socialist orientation and the Confucian conception of 
society (Wong, 1994). Underlying this discourse is a moral imperative that people 
should rely on their own resources for their well-being while taking responsibilities 
for the cause of national development (Nguyen, 2018). The social welfare contract 
between the state and workers is thus re-drawn, and social protection is reconceptu-
alised as self-responsibility as opposed to as rights in the global discourse.
“Socialization”, moreover, indicates the recasting of communal values rooted 
in socialism and Confucianism along the line of self-responsibility. Familialism, 
which promotes family support, filial duties, and women’s virtues, are now actively 
invoked for the provision of care (Nguyen & Chen, 2017; Truong et al., 2007). The 
associated notion of human/citizen quality (suzhi/dan tri) (Jacka, 2009; Kipnis, 
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2007; Nguyen & Locke, 2014) further underscores self-responsibility and self-reli-
ance. According to this logic, when needs arise, be it heath, care, or schooling, it 
is the family that should be the first port of call—only where there is no family, or 
where the family is dysfunctional, should one call on the government, but such sup-
port should be kept to the minimum. Meanwhile, the “socialization” of the most 
significant institutions of care, such as hospitals or aged care, often means that a 
significant part of their services are privatised and have to be paid for out of pocket 
at market prices. In Vietnam, this has been intensified through the recent drive to 
“autonomize” (tự chủ) public hospitals and higher education institutions, which 
boils down to asking these institutions to function as market actors.
The self-responsibility logics underlying “socialization” thus practically makes 
a mockery of the universalism of the new welfare programs. The increasing costs 
of care and schooling put higher burdens on migrant households, whose access to 
health insurance or social insurance programs does little to ease. Translocal strate-
gies (Jacka, 2018; Oakes & Schein, 2005) have become migrant workers’ solutions 
for their struggles between retaining a place in the global factories, and the care 
and reproduction work that is done by household members living in the countryside. 
Millions of left-behind populations, mostly children, women and elderly, in rural 
China by 2010s (He & Ye, 2014; Pan & Ye, 2017), had their livelihood and welfare 
dependent on their migrant parents’ remittance from the cities and family care in 
the villages. In Vietnam, migrant workers, especially the KT3 and KT4 categories, 
often have to access urban public schooling and childcare by bribes (Nguyen, 2015). 
Migrant children enrolled in the urban schools have to return to original regions 
when they reach higher secondary schools (Murphy, 2014; Nguyen & Locke, 2014). 
In both countries, the unpaid labour of care by rurally based members of migrant 
families, often of older women, is a form of covert “surplus value” extracted by 
global capital (Pun & Chan, 2012: 181) which should be recognized and remuner-
ated for if de-commodification were to be taken seriously. The “socialization” of 
welfare thus has effectively increased migrant workers’ precarity and does little to 
de-commodify labour.
As minimalist universal welfare barely covers the actual needs for social protec-
tion, it necessitates the rise of an assemblage of non-state providers such as reli-
gious organizations, community groups, NGOs, and private companies (Duckett & 
Carrillo, 2011; London, 2014; Nguyen & Chen, 2017), setting the stage for a com-
petitive market for welfare supervised by the state. In contrast to the notion of rela-
tively independent civil society organisations advocating for the rights of the needy,5 
non-state actors in China are more closely directed by the state (Hildebrandt, 2013; 
Wells-Dang, 2012). Relations between the state and labour NGOs in China have 
been particularly fraught. Local governments shifted to “welfarist incorporation” 
5 Although all civil society actors are under the state’s hegemonic influence in the Gramscian sense, 
non-state welfare providers in the West play more independent advocacy role. They not only offer sup-
plementary welfare, but also lobby or pressure the state to maintain some basic level of welfare provision 
against neoliberal austerity policy. For example, some specific constituencies in the UK—such as trade 
unions and voluntary agencies like the Child Poverty Action Group—actively defended state benefits 
against political efforts to reduce them (Giddens and Sutton 2013).
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strategy by facilitating labour NGOs in providing social services to migrant workers 
under government contracts (Howell, 2015). Mass organizations, namely the Wom-
en’s Union, the Elderly Association, and the Veteran’s Association, provide certain 
form of care for local people while exerting grassroots-level discipline and control. 
Nguyen (2015)’s fieldwork suggests that religious institutions such as Buddhist 
pagoda and Catholic Church in Vietnam increasingly play a greater role in welfare 
provision while exerting moral authority over migrant workers who find in them 
some of the protection against the precarity of their livelihoods. By drawing these 
social actors into the state’s orbit in welfare provision, “socialisation” opens up a 
whole new space for mobilization of resources and lays the ground for market actors 
to advance into social protection under the auspices of the state.
Welfare marketization
Not just promoting self-responsibility, the state is also actively enabling the mar-
ketization of welfare through facilitating market actors and using market logics in 
its operations. From the passing of the 2002 Government Procurement Law to the 
2016 Guiding Opinions on Supporting the Promotion and Development of Social 
Organizations through Government Purchase-of-services, the Chinese state has been 
relying on purchase or contracting out of social services to provide welfare for the 
migrant workers (Mok et al., 2020) for two purposes. First, the open and competitive 
bidding mechanisms for social service contracts are considered an “efficient” market 
solution for dealing with the welfare of a massive migrant labour population with 
minimum welfare burdens for the employers and governments. Second, and more 
important than cost-efficiency, by allowing party-organized NGOs (Thornton, 2013) 
or social enterprises (Mok et  al., 2017, 2020) to engage in education, emergency 
relief and even police services, the state frees up its resources for more supervisory 
and regulatory role to guarantee stability (Teets, 2012). Cho (2017)’s study focused 
on the Foxconn town in Shenzhen where superficial social services (such as sporting 
events and blind dates) for migrant workers were contracted out to numerous for-
profit social enterprises and placed under the state inspections, with social stability 
being a top priority. Social workers hired by those contracted enterprises to care 
for the migrant workers were ironically migrant youth themselves working under 
exploitative terms of employment.
In Vietnam, social protection programs increasingly involve market players 
and logics emphasizing “self-cultivation and value creation that resonate with the 
needs and anxieties of the market” (Schwenkel & Leshkowich, 2012: 386). Reli-
gious groups, amongst the institutions providing care for migrant workers, are reg-
ulated by the party state, yet have relatively high autonomy in their care services 
(Hansen, 2005). Nowadays, however, their services tend to come with a price tag 
and underlying market logics (Nguyen, 2015). Meanwhile, micro-insurance schemes 
are being promoted by the World Bank as social protection tool for populations that 
have limited access to social and commercial insurance. For instance, the Tao-Yeu-
May Mutual Assistance Fund, sponsored by the ILO, covers poor rural women, with 
risk protection measures building on existing mutual support channels (Handayani, 
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2016: 33). Experiences from other contexts suggest that commercial providers are 
likely to become more active in micro-insurance.
Indeed, the financialization of welfare is emerging as a strong re-commodifying 
factor. A burgeoning life insurance market has rapidly developed in China since 
1990s, as the state-owned and global commercial insurers actively mobilized the 
need of the population despite the cultural resistance (Chan, 2009; Nguyen, 2020a). 
Empirical research drawing on the China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study 
shows that private saving and commercial life insurance significantly lifted the low 
median replacement rate of public basic pension in 2013, from mere 15.4 to 48.7% 
(Zheng et  al., 2019). Since 2010s, internet finance technology has further pushed 
the fever of online capital speculation into new levels and resulted in serious invest-
ment bubbles and widespread Ponzi schemes (Wang et al., 2016). After losing his 
job with no unemployment benefits in 2017, one migrant worker from rural Jiangxi 
resorted to an online peer-to-peer finance company based in Shenzhen for a 90,000 
yuan (USD13,800) self-start-up loan. He ended up in direr financial situation a year 
later with compounded debt over 120,000 yuan (USD18,500). In another form, 
Raindrops Crowd Funding (Shuidichou), a crowd funding platform established as a 
start-up company in 2016 and later funded by venture capital (Liu, 2019), presents 
itself as social media charity to provide financial help to a tiny number of patients as 
advertisement exemplar, but ultimately works aggressively to expand membership 
base, even illegally selling members’ personal information to commercial medical 
insurers for profit.
In Vietnam, there has been similarly a surge in the use of lending apps among 
factory workers who quickly end up with unpayable loans, especially during the 
Covid-19 pandemic.6 More often than not loans are obtained to cover unexpected 
health expenses and income gaps between jobs. Meanwhile, rural families with adult 
children working in the cities or overseas increasingly embraced commercial life 
insurance to manage their heightened risks and precarity (Nguyen, 2020a). Nguy-
en’s ethnographic study shows that these families pay up to three-month worth of 
their income (about EUR700 per year) to purchase life insurance policy from global 
finance giants such as Prudential and AIA. Life insurance has become an integral 
part of what she refers to as “portfolios of social protection” in an institutional con-
text where rural people have to patch together an ad-hoc mix of social protection 
measures for which market options predominate. This has happened not despite their 
inclusion in state welfare programs, but precisely because of it (Nguyen, 2020a). 
Indeed, the very universalism of the current welfare system makes it possible for 
global finance to advance into the lives of working people in these contexts.
6 See media reporting of the issue at https:// laodo ng. vn/ cong- doan/ tin- dung- den- dang- hoanh- hanh- de- 
doa- su- an- toan- cua- cong- nhan- lao- dong- 764053. ldo (Dark credit is raging on, threatening the safety of 
workers); https:// nld. com. vn/ cong- doan/ cong- nhan- khon- don- voi- tin- dung- den- 20201 03121 26590 45. 
htm (Workers in dire situations because of dark credits); https:// nld. com. vn/ cong- doan/ vay- tien- qua- app- 
cong- nhan- ngheo- them- khon- kho- 20200 61609 29017 73. htm (Borrowing money via lending apps, poor 
workers suffer even more), all accessed on 20.11.2020.
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Conclusion
As export-oriented national development depends on the labour of hundreds of 
millions of rural migrants in China and Vietnam, welfare reforms targeted at “the 
worker question” must be considered as part of the party states’ paradoxical goals of 
market liberalization and socialist control. This paradox accounts for the entangle-
ment of market logics and practices with socialist discourses in the welfare system, 
in which imperatives for commodification and de-commodification continuously 
compete with each other. While capturing these overlapping processes, our notion 
of “the cycle of commodification” points to the greater role of finance in the re-com-
modification of labour that is actively enabled by party states that claim to be caring 
(Nguyen & Chen, 2017). Our analysis suggests that the new forms of universalism 
in China and Vietnam provide the very condition for the marketization of welfare, 
and as such act to facilitate re-commodification rather than de-commodification of 
labour in the sense of protecting it from the whims of the market (Esping-Anderson, 
1990).
The re-commodification process in both countries as such, however, does not sit 
easily within the much-critiqued neoliberal restructuring of global production that 
the Decent Work Agenda (ILO, 1999) seeks to counteract, nor does it alongside the 
“workfare” based labour re-commodification in the West (Levitas, 2005; Peck, 2002; 
Peck & Theodore, 2011). Even as both countries are firmly on the course towards 
greater marketization,7 the authoritarian state’s “socialist” visions and practices con-
tinue to shape the course of governance in ways that some authors term “neo-social-
ist” (Palmer & Winiger, 2019). The cycle of commodification reveals the tendency 
of welfare reforms to engage more market actors in the realisation of the state goals 
that remain socialist in official ideology. In this cycle, social protection increasingly 
turns away from redistributing improvements in living standards towards promot-
ing risk management. Yet risk management can produce debilitating levels of uncer-
tainty that are potentially damaging for social relations and lives. For the well-being 
of millions of migrant workers whose labour is critical to the development of both 
countries, the uncertainty is likely to be detrimental, eventually undermining the 
very basis of that development and the state’s claim to being a caring state.
This article has so far focused on the similarities of social policy in China and 
Vietnam, where Leninist party states pursue parallel development trajectories that 
rely heavily on the commodification of labour. The question of what accounts for 
the differences between them, be it historical, cultural, or institutional, is beyond the 
scope of the article. It warrants further research that will advance welfare regime 
theorization and the comparative studies of social policy in these countries and in 
the Global South more generally. In addition, the literature on welfare marketization 
7 See “Opinions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council on 
Accelerating the Improvement of the Socialist Market Economic System in the New Era” http:// www. 
xinhu anet. com/ 2020- 05/ 18/c_ 11260 01431. htm; “Vietnam, China hold theoretical workshop on reform 
experience”, https:// en. nhand an. org. vn/ polit ics/ exter nal- relat ions/ item/ 63585 02- vietn am- china- hold- 
theor etical- works hop- on- reform- exper ience. html. All accessed on 1.12.2020.
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and financialization is only emerging and there is much scope for future studies to 
consider how these unfold in particular contexts. We suggest that “the cycle of com-
modification” is a useful analytical framework for understanding the shifting dynam-
ics of welfare. By examining closely how the competing forces of commodification 
and de-commodification are implicated on the rationalities, designs and operations 
of a particular welfare system over time, we can achieve a fuller understanding of 
the changing place of labour in society and in the global economy.
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